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This working paper presents two related papers Beggar thy Neighbor? Application of 
SPS measures by the Russian Federation and a related case study: Case study: The 
impact of the Russian Import Ban on Ukrainian Confectionary Producers.  These papers 
are presented together as they  are separate, but highly interlinked papers.  
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 Beggar Thy Neighbor?  
Application of SPS measures by the 
Russian Federation 
Elena Besedina and Tom Coupe  
Kyiv School of Economics* 
Abstract 
Economists often view non-tariff measures as protectionist tools that 
can be used as supplement or compliment to traditional tariffs. In this 
paper we investigate the determinants of the SPS application by the 
Russian Federation. We hypothesize that, along with pure health safety 
and protectionist motives, SPS measures can be also used as means to 
exert political and economic pressure on the trading partners. For our 
analysis we use WTO data on SPS notifications by the Russian 
Federation since its accession to this organization. Our results seem to 
be supportive of this hypothesis as we find SPS measures 
disproportionally being applied to sectors that are ‘vulnerable’ for 
Russia’s trading partners.  
                                                             
*  This paper is written with financial support by “Non-tariff barriers, food safety and 
international food trade” joint project of Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
(NUPI),  University of Life Sciences and Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) funded by 
the Research Council of Norway (Contract no. 216742/O10). 
 1. Inroduction 
A survey conducted by UNCTAD among exporters in several developing 
countries ranks SPS and TBT measures the top trade barriers with on 
average 73 percent of the respondents viewing them as the primary 
trade barrier (UNCTAD 2010). 
Application of SPS measures is governed by the WTO agreement. 
While the WTO recognizes the right of its members to impose measures 
to protect human, plant and animal health, Article 2.2 of the Agree-
ment on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards clearly states that SPS 
measures “shall not be applied in a manner which would consti tute a 
disguised restriction on international trade”. This wording implies that 
SPS measures cannot be used as a tool to protect domestic market from 
foreign competitors.  
Many countries use SPS measures and other technical barriers to 
trade (TBTs) and in some cases the motives for these measures are 
questionable1. Kono (2006) finds that TBTs are often unrelated to 
consumer health concerns, represented by stringent domestic regula-
tions, “but are significantly related to traditional interest-group 
determinants of protection”.   
In this paper we try to distinguish between different motives for the 
introduction of SPS measures by studying which sectors and countries 
are more likely to get hit by such measures. We focus on SPS measures 
introduced and notified to the WTO by Russia, which by many 
observers has been suspected to use SPS measures as a way to exert 
political influence. While other studies have investigated determinants 
of trade measures before, this paper is the first to investigate to what 
extent trade measures are used to reach political rather than economic 
goals. 
On August 22, 2012, Russia became a Member of the WTO and since 
then, is obligated to comply with the WTO rules and agreements. 
However, according to the Global Trade Alert database, the Russian 
Federation is second in the world ranking of countries that frequently 
use trade barriers since global crisis of 2008 with 444 measures 
implemented as of January 1 2015. The ‘leader’ of the ranking is India 
with 619 measures implemented. 
More than 60 percent of measures imposed by Russia are qualified as 
‘red’ measures, i.e. “the measure has been implemented since 
November 2008 and almost certainly discriminates against foreign 
commercial interests” (Figure 1)2.  The red measures are differentiated 
                                                             
1   For example Kono (2006) points out to US avocado ban on Mexican imports or EU 
ban on hormone-treated beef. 
2  Global Trade Alert : www.gta.org 
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from the ‘amber’ measures: measures that have been implemented 
since November 2008 or announced and are under consideration and 
“likely involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests”. 
The harmless group of measures is classified as ‘green’ since they do 
not foresee any discrimination against foreign suppliers. 
Figure 1. Number of trade measures announced/implemented by Russian 
Federation since 2008 crisis 
 
 
Source: Global Trade Alert database, www.gta.org 
 
Over the last year Ukrainian exports (primarily foodstuff) to Russia 
were banned or limited more than 10 times (Box 1)3. The latest ban on 
vegetables came into force on October 22nd 2014. While is some cases 
all imports of specific products are banned, there are also cases when 
single companies are not allowed to import to Russia. One of such cases 
when all products of the Ukrainian confectionary giant Roshen were 
banned is analyzed in a companion case study by Coupe and Besedina 
(2015). 
                                                             
3  See Cenusa et al. (2014) for all discriminatory measures against Ukraine applied by 
Russia over 2013-2014. 
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For all these cases the Russian Federation did not make any official 
document publicly available that provides scientific evidence on a 
breach of its national food safety and quality standards. Moreover, 
other countries (e.g. Belarus) did not ban these products.  
Such bans did not only happen in 2014: for example, in February 
2012 Ukrainian exports of cheese and other dairy products were 
suspended. Many experts see a ‘political component’ in these trade 
disputes between Ukraine and Russia” (IER, 2012).  
Ukraine is not the only one to suffer from such Russian trade policy: 
two other countries that signed Association agreements with the EU 
also suffered from the trade policy of the RF (Cenusa, et al. 2014). And 
in July 2014, even European exports of foodstuff became subject of the 
so called ‘anti-sanctions’.  
In general, exporters that want to supply to the RF face certification 
requirements of agricultural products for which “certifications are 
unnecessary or are otherwise unwarranted” (USTR, 2013). Moreover, 
the American trade representative “has not received scientific 
justifications nor risk assessments for many of Russia’s SPS require-
ments” (ibid). 
Box 1. 
Russia’s  restrictive measures against Ukraine in the area of SPS 
over 2014. 
 June 16, 2014 ban on the import of potatoes from Ukraine 
(due to repeated cases of detection of a golden potato 
nematode) 
 July 28, 2014 ban on the import of the whole milk products. 
The list includes all 27 Ukrainian companies, which have 
been certified and have the right to export their products to 
Russia. 
 July 29, 2014 ban on the import of canned fruits and 
vegetables and canned fish from Ukraine. 
 August 15, 2014 ban on the Ukrainian exports of spirits, beer 
and beer drinks. 
 September 5, 2014 suspended imports of Ukrainian 
confectionery products 
 October 22, 2014 ban on vegetable products 
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As the GTA data show, Russia is one of the most active users of non-
tariff barriers in the world and is an interesting case for the analysis. In 
this paper we focus on the factors that determine the introduction of 
SPS measures. As mentioned above, we are interested to check whether 
SPS measures, as a representative of the class of non-tariff barriers, are 
used for political reasons. We are not the first one to look at non-tariff 
barriers determination; however, majority of the existing studies 
concentrate on the protectionist application of such measures. While 
we think protection of domestic producers is an important motive for 
policy makers we also believe that trade policy and SPS measures in 
particular can be used for exerting pressure on trading partners. Since 
non-tariff measures are often introduced by various agencies behind 
closed doors these measures are much less transparent and can be 
easily manipulated. As this is a less studied area in the trade policy 
determination we believe it deserves careful analysis. 
Several recent papers look at the determinants of NTBs around the 
world. Olarreaga and Vaillant (2011) study the macro and micro 
determinants of the non-tariff measures in Brazil’s trade policy. They 
use data on temporary trade barriers (TTBs) such as anti-dumping and 
safeguard measures. Over the period studied, the number of the TTBs 
used by Brazil has increased and this increase is primarily associated 
with appreciation of the real exchange rate and increased volumes of 
imports. At the same time, authors do not find statistical relationship 
between changes in the prices of imported goods and TTBs application, 
majority of which were antidumping cases. Gawande et al. (2011) 
examine the determinants of the trade policy for a number of countries 
including BRICS (excluding Russia), Argentina, Mexico and Turkey in 
the aftermath of the global crisis. The primary dependent variable in 
their analysis is bilateral tariffs at the 6-digit HS level. They show that 
global crisis did not lead to increased protectionism primarily due to 
interlinkages between firms in the global world. Vertical integration of 
foreign and domestic firms is associated with a lower level of pro-
tectionism. 
Aisbett and Pearson (2012) study the determinants of the changes 
in the number of SPS measures imposed. In particular, they try to 
differentiate between health concern motive and protectionist motive. 
They find that controlling for other factors which may affect SPS 
measures’ application “protectionist motives are one of the drivers of 
SPS measures”.  
In this paper, we use the same data on SPS notifications as Aisbett 
and Pearson (2012). Differently from their paper, we use data on 
notification by Russia and a more disaggregated data (4-digit level vs. 
2-digit level in Aisbett and Pearson, 2012). Also in their paper they do 
not differentiate against whom the measure was imposed as they focus 
on the reasons why some countries use more SPS measures than others 
do. Another advantage of focusing on a single country is a possibility to 
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disregard institutional variables that seem to play important role in 
trade policy determination. As discussed above, we are not the first to 
concentrate on one imposing country: Gawande et al. (2011) and 
Olarreaga and Vaillant (2011) also analyze single countries but they do 
not consider SPS measures as we do. For our analysis we employ con-
ditional logit model which allows to control for unobservable charac-
teristics of the Russian trading partners. Our results suggest that 
application of SPS measures by the Russian Federation was not always 
driven by public health concerns. These measures are generally found 
in the sectors which make trading partner more sensitive to imposed 
measures and sectors where Russia is a net importer and sectors. 
The paper is structured as follows. We start with the discussion of 
the motives behind government policy suggested in the earlier 
literature, both theoretical and empirical. Section 3 discusses our 
empirical strategy, while Section 4 describes the data used in the 
analysis. Empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 5. 
We conclude with final remarks in Section 6.   
2. Non-tariff barriers: Differentiating between the motives 
Trade economists have been investigating the shift from tariff to non-
tariff barriers. Ray (1987) provides several possible explanations for 
such shift. First, countries resort to non-tariff measures since they do 
not have to rely on tariff revenues as they become richer. Second, while 
tariffs are more strictly regulated in the international trade system (first 
GATT and now WTO), the non-tariff measures allow for more discretion 
in their application. And, finally, Ray (1987) claims that “they can be 
used effectively by special interest groups incapable of getting 
government support for tariff protection”.  
Non-tariff barriers can either serve as substitutes or compliments for 
the traditional tariffs. Thus for the U.S. trade policy makers the two 
types are found to be substitutes (Ray, 1981). At the same time, Lee 
and Swagel (1994) using data for 41 countries for 1988 show that 
tariffs and NTMs are compliments. Ronen (2014) also studies this rela-
tionship in cross-country perspective and finds that there is substation 
effect in low-income countries, while in middle and high income 
countries tariffs and NTMs seem to be complements. The effect also dif-
fers across sectors: for more advanced (higher value added) sectors two 
types are substitutes while for more traditional sectors (food, wood, 
textiles) application of NTMs is complementary to application of tariffs.  
Disaggregated analysis of specific non-tariff barriers also seems to 
produce ambiguous results. While Bown and Tovar (2007) find that 
preceding decline in tariff rates on average increases likelihood of 
introduction of anti-dumping and safeguard measures in India, the 
effect differs across sectors. Moore and Zanardi (2011) study the 
relationship between the use of antidumping measures and the 
Elena Besedina and Tom Coupe 
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changes in the applied sectoral tariffs. They use unbalanced panel with 
data for 36 countries over the period from 1991 to 2002 and find that 
antidumping procedures are used as substitutes for tariffs only by 
countries who use this type of trade policy tools a lot (more than 50 AD 
procedures over the period).  The substitution effect is absent in other 
countries.  
Economists agree that trade policies are not formulated in vacuum. 
One of the first studies of the determinants of the trade policy is written 
by Ray (1981). He uses data on the U.S. trade policy in 1970 and finds 
that both tariff and nontariff trade restrictions are primarily introduced 
in sectors where the U.S. has comparative disadvantage, for example, 
unskilled-labor intensive industries. Ray (1981) also points out that 
electoral concerns seem to play important role in determining trade 
policy as well: sectors that are “distributed across regions of the United 
States in a fashion consistent with the distribution of population and, 
therefore, voting power in Congress”. 
Researchers also compared institutional settings in which trade 
policy is formulated. The institutions affect trade policy usually 
through either empowerment of special interests or reduction of their 
influence (e.g.  Baldwin, 1986; Rogowski, 1987, Busch and Mansfield, 
1995, Grossmand and Helpman, 2005). Such institutional settings as 
electoral systems, number of political parties, and size of constitu-
encies seem to be important determinants of trade policy (e.g. Hatfield 
and Hauk, Jr, 2003).  
Economic theory has offered several directions to explain the 
decision to use or not to use particular policy tool.  Political economists 
view governments’ decisions on specific policy as maximizing an objec-
tive function of the form:   
 
The objective function is broadly composed of two terms: W is aggre-
gate welfare and C is some sort of private interest.  In Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) the second element consists of campaign contribu-
tions. In general, the second element could be anything that increases 
either reelection probability of the politicians or serves personal 
welfare. 
Hence, depending on how much governments care about aggregate 
welfare, their policy decisions can be not welfare improving and driven 
by other motives. Gawande et al. (2009) estimate the weight parameter, 
a, using data for over fifty countries and find that this parameter (the 
weight that governments place on aggregate social welfare versus their 
private interests) varies significantly across countries (from as low as 
0.6 for Nepal to as high as 404.3 for Singapore). 
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Introduction of any non-tariff barrier can also be analyzed using this 
approach: that is imposition of an NTB can be thought of being driven 
by several motives. In case of SPS and benevolent government, the 
leading concern of the government would be aggregate welfare, and in 
particular, human health protection.  Existing empirical evidence 
points to other motives behind the decisions of the government to 
introduce or make stricter SPS measures. Below, we discuss the 
intuition and empirical studies on the possible motives of the 
government.    
2.1. Health related concerns 
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures in general are used to ensure that 
food consumed in the country (whether domestically produced or 
imported) is safe for human health, as well as that animal and plant 
health is not endangered (WTO)4.  There are several approaches 
suggested in the literature. One approach suggested by Kono (2009) is 
to identify sectors that are similar to those with SPS measures: if SPS 
measures are not applied to similar sectors, then this questions the 
public health concern behind SPS application.  
Another approach that was used by Aisbett and Pearson (2012) is to 
use proxies for the level of health and environmental consciousness of 
the countries when studying the determinants of the SPS. In particular, 
the authors used two types of indices: Environmental Performance 
Index (EPI) and Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI).  They find 
that introduction of SPS measures is correlated with higher levels of 
environmental quality as proxied by these two indices.   
2.2. Protection of domestic producers 
According to the WTO rules, the SPS measures should not be used as 
protectionist tools. However, many trade economists suspect that SPS 
measures are often used to favor domestic producers “in the guise of 
ensuring human, animal, or plant safety” (USTR, 2013).  
When TBTs and SPS measures are used to protect domestic 
producers they will have similar determinants as traditional tools like 
tariffs and quotas. In general these determinants can be classified into 
several groups. 
Macroeconomic factors 
NTBs can be used to address problems created by macroeconomic 
shocks (Olarreaga and Vaillant, 2011).  
Gawande et al. (2011) examine the determinants of the trade policy 
for a number of countries including BRICS (excluding Russia), 
Argentina, Mexico and Turkey in the aftermath of the global crisis. The 
primary dependent variable in their analysis is bilateral tariffs at the 6-
                                                             
4  www.wto.org 
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digit HS level. They show that global crisis did not lead to increased 
protectionism primarily due to interlinkages between firms in the 
global world. Vertical integration of foreign and domestic firms is 
associated with a lower level of protectionism. 
Stronger domestic currency (exchange rate appreciation) with 
respect to the currency of a trading partner increases the probability of 
observing an antidumping or safeguard measure against this trading 
partner (Moore and Zanardi, 2011; Olarreaga and Vaillant, 2011).  
A similar effect on the likelihood of an NTM can be expected from 
the current account. If the current account is in deficit this would make 
policy makers more protectionist. Empirical evidence suggests that the 
effect varies across countries: while antidumping petitions are more 
frequent under negative current account in developed countries, the 
effect is positive for developing countries. (Moore and Zanardi, 2011). 
Mansfield and Busch (1995) also use macroeconomic variables to 
study the likelihood of the imposition of an NTB by a country. The 
dependent variable measured as the share of inputs subject to NTBs is 
found to be influenced by unemployment and real exchange rate: 
higher unemployment and appreciated real exchange rate are 
associated with higher incidence of NTBs.  
Weak industries 
Similar to tariffs, governments are found to use NTMs to protect weak 
industries that face increased import competition (Lee and Swagel, 
1994; Thornsbury, 1999).   
Increased import competition proxied with the imports growth and 
import penetration ratio seem to increase probability of the anti-
dumping petition and consequent favorable ruling (Moore and Zanardi, 
2011).  
Political factors: 
Political determinants of trade policy (an SPS in particular) are related 
to the reelection motives of the politicians. Industries that employ 
significant amounts of labor are more likely to be protected since 
policies that favor these industries will ensure many votes for the 
politicians. Another factor is geographic concentration of the industry 
makes it more attractive for the politicians since it is easier for the 
management to monitor whether its employees vote in the elections 
(Busch and Mansfield, 2007). Hence more geographically concentrated 
industries are more likely to protected (empirical evidence in 
McGillivray, 2004 and Busch and Reinhardt, 1999). 
It is widely recognized that a key to whether an industry obtains 
protection is the extent to which it is able to organize politically. The 
organized industries can ensure favorable policy through campaign 
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contributions (e.g. Goldberg and Maggi 1999; Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay 2000). While in the seminal paper developed by 
Grossman and Helpman in 1994, industry organization was exo-
genous, later papers endogenize this process and show that more con-
centrated industries or industries populated with large firms are better 
able to get organized by overcoming free rider problem and hence 
receive more protection (e.g. Bombardini, 2008).  
Vertical integration of the industry into global markets 
Global supply chains allow placing production stages in different 
countries. In this case “protecting a stage of production is different 
from protecting the market for a good with no production sharing” 
(Gawande et al., 2011). The difference occurs because such protection 
increases the cost of intermediates for the overseas or domestic pro-
ducer who uses them as inputs and hence lowers his demand for these 
intermediates. Thus if industry is highly integrated in the global value 
chain of production, then one would observe lower level of protection 
of this industry. Gawande et al., (2011) test this prediction using two 
measures of the vertical specialization. The first measure uses the share 
of imports in a sector that is used directly and indirectly in the 
country’s own exports. The second measure is defined as the 
proportion of a sector’s exports used as intermediates by exporters in 
other countries.  Their results suggest that firms sectors integrated in 
the global value chains are less likely to be protected.   
2.3. Political pressure on trading partners  
The majority of the existing studies concentrate on the second group of 
factors related to protectionism.  While we think protection of domestic 
producers is an important motive for policy makers we also believe that 
trade policy and SPS measures in particular can be used for exerting 
political pressure on trading partners. Since non-tariff measures are 
often introduced by various agencies behind closed doors these 
measures are much less transparent and can be easily manipulated.  
If the underlying reasons behind the decision to impose trade barri-
ers are either to punish a trading partner or exert political pressure, the 
determinants of the sector choice, where the new barrier is introduced, 
differ from protectionist drivers. In this case, one would not observe 
any previous ‘threat’ from the trading partner in the form of lower 
prices or increased quantity. Here the choice is not whether to impose a 
new NTM but rather where (which sector). Therefore, the vulnerability 
of trading partners to the measures imposed is the main driver of the 
choice. This vulnerability is defined by sector characteristics: 
Importance of host country market for exporting country 
If market of the host country accounts for a large share in total exports 
in a specific category than in case of application of an NTM (and SPS 
often come in the form of complete ban on imports) foreign exporter 
will incur large losses. And is the goods in this category which became 
Elena Besedina and Tom Coupe 
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subject of an NTM constitute large proportion in total exports of the 
foreign country, the effect may be damaging. Hence if political pressure 
motive dominates one would expect to observe SPS in sectors which are 
important for the foreign country. At the same time, if imports are vital 
for the host country or if the trading partner is very important host 
country may decide not to impose SPS measures against important 
trade partner or against vital imports. Therefore it is important to 
control for these factors as well.  
As preliminary evidence, Table A1 in Appendix lists 4-digit sectors 
affected by SPS measures (which are primarily in the form of complete 
bans) and importance of Russian market for Ukrainian exporters. In all 
sectors, the share of the Russian Federation is close or exceeds 20 
percent, and in some sectors it is above 80 percent making Ukrainian 
exporters very vulnerable to such ‘sudden’ stops of exports into the RF. 
Substitutability of affected imports with domestic production or 
imports from other countries 
Broda et al. (2008) estimate disaggregated foreign export supply elasti-
cities and find that countries that are not members of the World Trade 
Organization systematically set higher tariffs on goods that are 
supplied inelastically. That is market power, which is inversely related 
to export supply elasticity, allows countries to ‘protect’ these sectors  
using trade policy tool (tariff). Obviously, market power argument can 
also be used for political pressure explanation of SPS application: host 
country is more likely to impose SPS where it is less harmed (has higher 
market power).  
Vulnerability of exports to delays (how perishable goods are, etc.)  
Goods that are sensitive to delays would naturally be a target in case of 
a trade war. Sensitivity is determined by the goods characteristics. 
Since SPS measures apply primarily to food categories, a natural factor 
to consider would be how perishabile the goods supplied are. If there is 
a sudden barrier to exports non-perishable goods can be stored until 
the barriers removed or directed to another market.    
Our empirical model outlined in the next section takes into account 
these three groups of factors that potentially affect the decision of the 
policy makers whether to use SPS and if yes in which sectors. 
3. Econometric Analysis 
We will follow the approach used in the literature (e.g. Kono, 2006; 
Aissbett and Pearson, 2012) to investigate the relationship between 
SPS measures with other consumer health variables. If SPS measures 
are correlated with proxies for consumer pressures, such as domestic 
health and environmental regulations, then primary motive is likely to 
be consumer protection. If on the other hand they are correlated with 
the other groups of factors of more traditional trade barriers such as 
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quotas and import licenses, then such measures are protectionist and 
political in disguise.  
In order to study the determinants of the decision to introduce a new 
SPS measure we use data on notifications about SPS measures. 
Researchers primarily use two available datasets on SPS: importing 
country’s notifications to the WTO and exporting countries’ concerns 
about the SPS measures in their countries of destination. While it is 
appropriate to study the effect of SPS measures on exports using SPS 
concerns database (e.g. Besedina, 2014), in this paper the data on 
notifications are more suitable since we investigate the factors that are 
driving introduction of new SPS measures. Not all SPS measures would 
cause concerns among the trading partners and hence if we were to use 
SPS concerns we would miss many measures that were announced/ 
introduced. Also since SPS measures that do not raise concerns might 
be viewed by countries as ‘fair’ and caused by health concerns, using 
concerns data would lead to selection bias. Another reason why we 
think that notifications are more useful in our analysis is that there is 
often a time lag between introduction of a measure and time when 
concern is raised by a trading partner.  
Our empirical model specifies the decision to introduce an SPS 
measure as a function of three groups of factors described in Section 2. 
SPSt = f (Health concerns t-1, Protectionism factors t-1,t -2, Political 
pressure factor t-1) 
Our dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if an SPS mea-
sure was imposed in the specific sector against specific country(ies).  
The set of the explanatory variables include three groups of 
variables classified according to the motive of the SPS application.  
The first group consists of a health concern proxy, while the second 
group is more numerous and includes macro-factors and import com-
petition. Unfortunately, we cannot include the real exchange rate since 
data on real bilateral exchange rates are not available at the data fre-
quency (quarterly) that we use in the paper, however. Also the data for 
the domestic industries in Russia (production, import penetration) at 
the 4-digit level of HS classification are not available to construct 
variables related to reelection probabilities. Following previous litera-
ture (e.g. Aisbett and Pearson, 2012; Ronen, 2014) we construct vari-
able Tariff Overhang as the difference between the bound and applied 
tariff for each country/product observation. It is included in group 2 
since, the smaller overhang would imply lower scope for tariff appli-
cation and hence if the relationship is negative, than negotiated tariff 
reductions can be viewed as a driver for SPS (Aisbett and Pearson, 
2012). The coefficient on this variable can also be interpreted as 
measuring the degree of substitution between SPS and tariffs (Ronen, 
Elena Besedina and Tom Coupe 
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2014). The third group of variables represents sectoral characteristics. 
All explanatory variables and expected signs are discussed in Table 1. 
To estimate the coefficients of our model, we use a conditional logit 
methodology. This is motivated by the fact that our dependent variable 
is binary (one if there is a measure, zero otherwise) and by the fact that 
we want to include a country fixed effect to capture possible omitted 
variables that are country-specific but do not vary over time. Given that 
the conditional logit model estimates coefficients by comparing states 
with and without measures for given countries, countries that never 
have been ‘sanctioned’ by Russia drop out of the sample.  
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TABLE 1. Determinants of SPS 
 
Health concerns 
Environmental 
proxy 
- More stringent standards in Russia relative 
to its trading partner will make application 
of SPS measure more likely if government 
cares about citizen’s health 
Protectionism 
Import volume 
growth 
+ Increased imports pose threat to domestic 
producers and hence if government will be 
more likely to use trade policy to restrict 
undesired imports   
Imported price 
growth 
- Decrease in price of imported goods can 
signal of potential dumping and hence host 
country will be likely to impose a trade barrier 
Trade balance + Positive bilateral trade balance implies that 
imports exceed exports   
Tariff overhang - The smaller the difference between bound and 
applied tariff rate the less scope the 
government has in applying tariffs and hence 
more likely the application of NTMs is.  
Political pressure 
Market importance 
for foreign country 
+ Larger the share of the host country market in 
the exports makes trading partner more 
sensitive to trade barriers imposed by host 
country 
Sector importance 
for foreign country 
+ Similar as above 
Partner importance 
for host country 
- If a trading partner accounts for a large share 
in host country’s trade the imposition of NTBs 
may hurt trade relations and hence is less 
likely 
Partner importance 
in the sector 
-/+ Similar argument as above: if imports are vital 
for the host country, the latter may decide not 
to impose and NTB. On the other hand, partner 
importance in the sector is related to market 
importance for the trading partner exporters 
and hence can be positively correlated with 
SPS measures. 
Inverse Export 
Elasticity 
+ The higher the inverse export supply 
elasticity, the higher the market power Russia 
has in a particular sector. 
Perishability + As discussed above, more perishable goods 
are more vulnerable to trade barriers 
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4. Data description 
Data on sanitary and phytosanitary measures come from the WTO 
database, SPS Information Management System. According to the WTO 
agreement on SPS each member country is required to notify the WTO 
about the changes or additions to country’s SPS regulations. Countries 
reports two types of notifications: regular and emergency. The first type 
of notifications mainly refer to routine (often planned) changes in the 
SPS regulations within member countries while emergency notifica-
tions are supposed to be used as ad hoc measures to deal with, for 
example, disease outbreaks. Majority of the measures are officially 
initiated by Rosselkhoznadzor (The Federal Service for Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Supervision) responsible for veterinary and sanitary 
control. Overall, since accession to the WTO, Russian Federation made 
81 notifications (As of November 1 2014)5. Emergency notifications 
account for more than half of all notifications (43 notifications).  We 
focus our attention on the SPS measures which are applied against 
specific countries and use bilateral data and hence we exclude SPS 
measures which are applied to all trading partners.6   
The data for determinants of the SPS measures come from various 
sources. Trade and tariff data come from the International Trade 
Center. Trade data include quarterly bilateral data on the value of 
imports as well as physical quantity of imports into Russian Federation 
disaggregated at 4-digit level.7 Since SPS measures are very specific 
policy tools and they do not apply to many sectors we limit our sample 
to sectors where SPS can be applied. Our sample includes all 4-digit 
sectors with codes 0101-2403.8 Tariff data include data on bilateral 
tariff rates applied by Russian Federation towards its trading partners 
and bound tariff rates to which Russia is committed according to 
international trade agreements.9 Applied tariffs vary from zero to as 
high as 579.72% (applied to imports of Ethyl alcohol & other spirits, 
coded 2207).  
Foreign export elasticities for Russian market are estimated by 
Broda et al. (2008) under Armington assumption that goods are 
                                                             
5  We count only notifications about new measures according to the official 
numbering by the WTO. Each notification (either regular or emergency) has official 
number of the form G/SPS/N/RUS/29. Countries also notify about changes in the 
measures previously notified by them. These types of notifications are coded as 
amendments to the existing notifications and have numbers of the form 
G/SPS/N/RUS/29/Add.1.  
6  Overall there were 27 notifications about SPS measures that are applied to all 
trading partners many of which were related to Customs Union harmonization. 
Since SPS measures that are applied to all trading partners are more likely to be 
driven by health and safety concerns we should be cautious in the interpretation of 
our results and keep in mind possible selection bias.   
7  Downloaded from www.trademap.org 
8  According to 2007 HS classification.  
9  Downloaded from www.macmap.org 
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differentiated by country of origin.10 It should be noted that elasticities 
were estimated prior to Russia’s accession to the WTO and hence the 
estimated coefficients should be treated with caution.  
Following Aisbett and Pearson (2012) we also use the Environ-
mental Performance Index (EPI) but do not use the second index ESI 
which is available only for 2005.11 We use EPI to construct an indicator 
which shows the difference between Russian environment performance 
and environment performance of its trading partner and is defined as 
the ratio of trading partner with respect to the indicator of the RF. We 
hypothesize that if the RF is motivated by health concerns than it is 
more likely to impose SPS measures against countries which are worse 
than RF in environmental performance.  
To test the vulnerability hypothesis we use trade data to construct 
trading partner share in total imports of the RF. Categorical variable 
perishable takes on three values: 0 if goods supplied are non-perish-
able, equal to 1 if semi-perishable  and 2 if perishable.12 We include 
separate dummies for the last two categories in our econometric 
analysis. 
Our sample contains almost14,500 of country/product/quarter 
observations. Descriptive statistics is presented in Table 2. 
The countries in our sample that had positive trade with Russia were 
net exporters to Russian Federation in foodstuff trade. There is a signifi-
cant time variation in the imported quantity and unit price of imports, 
though on average there was a decline in quantity and prices of 
imports. Countries in the sample also have very different environ-
mental scores and on average have higher scores than Russia. In some 
sectors single trading partners supply the entire Russian market of a 
specific category of goods. Also there is a large variation in the 
importance of the sectors for exporting countries but on average shares 
of each 4-digit sectors in total exports of trading partners are rather low 
(less than 0.2 percent) which is expected at such level of disaggrega-
tion. More than 30 percent of 4-digit sectors in the sample are classified 
as semi-perishable (25 percent) or perishable (7 percent).  Even though 
in theory, the share of Russian market should not exceed 100 percent 
of the exports of a trading partner in a specific sector we do observe in 
the date some cases where this number exceeds 100. There are two 
plausible explanations for this fact. First, we do not take into account 
re-export data and hence large numbers can be evidence of trading 
partners re-exporting goods into Russia. Second, since we use quarterly 
                                                             
10  Downloaded from 
http://www.columbia.edu/~dew35/TradeElasticities/TradeElasticities.html 
11  For detailed description of the indicators see http://epi.yale.edu/ (EPI). 
12  To construct this variable we use information from 
https://nationalvetcontent.edu.au/.  
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data there could be some noise in the data. To see if the outliers are 
important we estimate our model on full sample and on reduced 
sample without outliers (observations where ‘Market importance for 
exp country’ exceeds 200 percent, overall slightly more than 200 
observations were dropped). The results do not change at all and our 
analysis we proceed with reduced sample described in Table 2.    
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SPS (dummy) 14476 0.01 0.09 0 1 
      EPI ratio 14476 129.78 22.51 58.4 154.6 
      %Δ in imported qty, from t-2 to t-1 14476 -51.70 59825.68 -2314276 5186208 
%Δ in unit value, from t-2 to t-1 14476 -4.46 1676.42 -170073.5 90645.3 
Tariff overhang 14476 2.08 10.00 -39.10 80 
Trade balance at t-1 14476 10.10 1.95 0 13.59 
      Market importance for exp country, t-1 14315 10.41 23.46 0 199.44 
Sector importance for exp country, t-1  14458 0.19 0.71 0 15.46 
Partner share in total imports, t-1 14476 2.73 3.29 0 12.7 
Partner share in the sector, t-1 14476 5.06 11.16 0 100 
Inverse Export Elasticity 13763 8.83 38.90 0.0 1254.5 
Semi-perishable (dummy) 14476 0.25 0.44 0.0 1 
Perishable (dummy) 14476 0.07 0.25 0 1 
5. Results 
We estimate several specifications of our empirical model. The 
estimation results are presented in Table A2 in Appendix. We start with 
two traditional groups of determinants: welfare improvement (health 
concerns) and protectionist. The results are reported in column (1) and 
(2) in the table. In the first specification we use change in quantity and 
unit price from t-1 to t, while in the second we allow for sluggishness in 
the decision making by using change from t-2 to t-1. In both specifica-
tions, the proxy for difference in environmental quality (EPI ratio) is 
highly statistically significant but has unexpected sign. Since lower 
values of the proxy correspond to countries with lower than the RF’s 
environmental values SPS measures are more likely to be introduced 
against countries with higher environmental standards. Hence, the 
results seem to go against the claims that SPS measures are imposed 
due to health concerns. The odds ratio for net trade balance is around 
1.30, which implies that 1% increase in net imports increases the odds 
of SPS application by more than 30%. In other words, the larger the net 
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imports in the specific sector the more likely that in this sector an SPS is 
introduced. Contrary to Aisbett nd Pearson (2012) we do not find 
statistically significant relationship between tariff overhang and 
application of SPS measures. Also, the coefficient on the change in the 
unit trade value is not as it would be expected if policymakers were 
driven by protectionist concerns: SPS measure is more likely to be 
imposed where the unit price actually increased (in both time periods) 
but the effect is extremely small as the odds ratio is practically 1, 
implying that 1% increase in unit value of imports is associated with 
less than 0.1% change in odds. 
Next we add variables from the third groups of determinants to the 
base specification. The first subgroup includes the variables that 
control for importance of the exports/imports in a specific sector for a 
trading partners/Russia (column (3)). Three out of four variables are 
statistically significant: sectors which account for larger share in 
trading partners sectors are more likely to be ‘punished’ with a trade 
barrier in the form of an SPS measure. The odds ratio is 1.19 meaning 
that each additional 1% increase in the share of sector in total exports 
of trading partner raises the odds of observing SPS measure in this 
sector by 19%. The other two variables that are used as controls also 
have expected signs: the Russian Federation seems not to impose SPS 
measures against important trading partners (one percent increase in 
partner’s share in bilateral trade decreases the odds of SPS application 
by 80%). Also increase in the partner’s share in the total imports in the 
sector is associated with 2% increase in odds of observing SPS which 
implies that this variable is related to market importance for trading 
partner. The other factors (environmental proxy, change in unit price 
and trade balance) do not lose their significance while magnitude of 
the effect does change, especially for environmental variable (the odds 
ratio drops from 11.8 to 3.7).  
In column (4) we test market power hypothesis introducing inverse 
export elasticity in the base specification, which turns to be insignifi-
cant. As in the previous case, factors that were important in base 
specification do not lose explanatory power and the odds ratios are 
practically unchanged in the magnitude. And, finally we test sector 
vulnerability to delays (column (5)). As results show, SPS measures are 
more likely to be introduced in sectors with more perishable goods: 
when goods switch from non-perishable category to semi-perishable 
and to perishable the odds of having SPS measure are multiplied by a 
factor 3.12 and 4.58, respectively. 
Columns (6) reports results for specifications where all variables are 
included. The results are practically unchanged with all statistically 
significant factors from other specifications retaining their explanatory 
power. Previous studies pointed out to significance of macroeconomic 
factors for trade policy determination (Moore and Zanardi, 2011; 
Olarreaga and Vaillant, 2011; Aisbett and Pearson, 2012). To control 
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for these factors we include quarterly time dummies (specification (7)). 
Once time dummies are included, health concerns proxy, trading 
partner importance and change in unit price lose their significance, 
while other factor are not affected by inclusion of time dummies.  
In our analysis we used data on both types of notifications: regular 
and emergency notifications. While regular notifications are usually 
planned beforehand and often are related to changes in domestic SPS 
regulations, one can suspect that emergency notifications are more 
likely to be used in the opportunistic trade policy. To verify if type of 
notifications matters, we rerun specifications (6) and (7) for emergency 
notifications which can be quickly imposed and potentially can be used 
for other than health protection motives.  The results of the estimation 
are presented in column (8) and (9), respectively. Emergency notifica-
tions seem to be also driven by the same factors that influence the 
introduction of all SPS measures. It is not surprising that the factors 
that are important for all notifications, also determine decisions on 
emergency notifications, which account for the majority of observa-
tions in our sample.  
6. Concluding remarks 
With the reduction in tariffs that followed major trade negotiations 
rounds in Uruguay and Doha, the international trade is still far from 
being ‘free’. Instead of traditional tools, countries around the world 
started to use more actively so called non-tariff measures. A subset of 
these measures, known as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards, 
has been named by exporters as the most important barrier to trade 
(UNCTAD, 2010). In general, SPS measures are designed to ensure 
food, animal and plant safety. But is the application of these measures 
against foreign companies always justified?  
In this paper, we study the factors that affect introduction of SPS 
measures by the Russian Federation against its trading partners. 
According to the Global Alert database, Russia is one of the most active 
users of non-tariff barriers in the world. For our analysis, we use the 
WTO database with official notifications about SPS measures intro-
duced by member-countries.  Our results suggest that factors that are 
related to protection of domestic producers and, more importantly, to 
political pressure appear to be important determinants of Russian SPS 
measures. Thus, the Russian Federation seems to apply SPS measures 
to sectors where it is a net importer and to sectors which are important 
for trading countries and to goods which are vulnerable to delays. 
Contrary to other studies (e.g. Aisbett and Pearson, 2012) we do not 
find any relationship between tariff overhang and application of SPS 
measures, suggesting that for Russia tariffs and SPS measures are not 
related.  
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As our findings suggest Russia’s SPS measures seem to be used for 
other than human and animal protection motives. In the globalized 
world the role of international trade intuition such as the WTO is to 
ensure that all countries avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable application of 
such measures. As Kono (2009) points out, it is the challenge for the 
WTO to ensure that SPS measures are used to protect public health and 
safety but are not abused.  
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A1. Ukrainian exports affected by SPS measures introduced by the RF 
and the share of Russian market in the Ukrainian exports in the sector 
 
HS code Product category 
Russia's share in 
Ukraine’s exports 
in the sector 
'0402 Milk and cream, concentrated or sweetened 30.13 
'0404 Whey and natural milk products nes  23.49 
'0405 Butter and other fats and oils derived from milk 45.39 
'0406 Cheese and curd 86.80 
      
'1702 Sugars, nes, incl chem pure lactose etc; artif honey; caramel 37.47 
'1704 Sugar confectionery (incl white choc), not containing cocoa 43.00 
'1806 Chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa 61.54 
      
'2001 Cucumbers, gherkins and onions preserved by vinegar 87.25 
'2002 Tomatoes prepared or preserved 83.78 
'2004 Prepared or preserved vegetables nes (incl. frozen) 46.46 
'2005 Prepared or preserved vegetables nes (excl. frozen) 63.31 
'2007 Jams, fruit jellies & marmalades 42.58 
'2008 Preserved fruits nes 19.53 
'2009 Fruit & vegetable juices, unfermented 49.00 
      
'2203 Beer made from malt 69.76 
'2208 Spirits, liqueurs, other spirit beverages, alcoholic preparations 52.14 
 
 
 
 Appendix 
TABLE A2. Estimation results for conditional logit model, odds ratios are reported 
 
Group VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Health concerns EPI ratio 11.801*** 9.045*** 3.739** 9.609*** 8.982*** 
  
[6.963] [4.987] [2.062] [5.410] [4.962] 
Protectionist motives %Δ in imported qty, from t-1 to t 0.999 
    Import competition 
 
[0.000] 
    
 
%Δ in unit value, from t-1 to t 1.000* 
    
  
[0.000] 
    
 
%Δ in imported qty, from t-2 to t-1 
 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
%Δ in unit value, from t-2 to t-1 
 
1.000** 1.000* 1.000** 1.000* 
   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
Trade balance at t-1 1.335*** 1.380*** 1.401*** 1.413*** 1.262*** 
  
[0.080] [0.084] [0.089] [0.090] [0.078] 
 
Tariff overhang 0.995 0.994 0.995 0.996 0.990 
  
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Political pressure Market importance for exp country, t-1 
  
1.002 
  Importance 
   
[0.003] 
  
 
Sector importance for exp country, t-1  
  
1.192** 
  
    
[0.093] 
  
 
Partner share in total imports, t-1 
  
0.195*** 
  
    
[0.054] 
  
 
Partner share in the sector, t-1 
  
1.020*** 
  
    
[0.007] 
  Market power Inverse Export Elasticity 
   
0.998 
 
     
[0.005] 
 Sensitivity Semi-perishable 
    
3.115*** 
      
[0.666] 
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Perishable 
    
4.575*** 
      
[1.289] 
 
Conditioning group Country Country Country Country Country 
 
Time fixed effects No No No No No 
  Observations 14,115 14,476 14,315 13,763 14,476 
Note:  SE in the brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 TABLE A2. (continued)          Emergency SPS 
 
Group VARIABLES (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Health concerns EPI ratio 3.984** 3.295  4.231** 4.202 
  
[2.257] [3.551]  [2.668] [8.120] 
Protectionist motives %Δ in imported qty, from t-1 to t 
  
 
  Import competition 
   
 
  
 
%Δ in unit value, from t-1 to t 
  
 
  
    
 
  
 
%Δ in imported qty, from t-2 to t-1 1.000 1.000  1.000 1.000 
  
[0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] 
 
%Δ in unit value, from t-2 to t-1 1.000* 1.000  1.000 1.000 
  
[0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] 
 
Trade balance at t-1 1.299*** 1.382***  1.278*** 1.355*** 
  
[0.090] [0.107]  [0.092] [0.110] 
 
Tariff overhang 0.992 0.996  0.981 0.985 
  
[0.009] [0.010]  [0.012] [0.013] 
Political pressure Market importance for exp country, t-1 0.999 0.998  0.999 0.997 
Importance 
 
[0.004] [0.005]  [0.004] [0.005] 
 
Sector importance for exp country, t-1  1.253*** 1.271***  1.271*** 1.329*** 
  
[0.103] [0.115]  [0.107] [0.124] 
 
Partner share in total imports, t-1 0.206*** 0.682  0.207*** 0.675 
  
[0.058] [0.224]  [0.059] [0.238] 
 
Partner share in the sector, t-1 1.020*** 1.020**  1.019** 1.019** 
  
[0.007] [0.008]  [0.008] [0.008] 
Market power Inverse Export Elasticity 0.996 0.997  0.998 0.998 
  
[0.005] [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005] 
Sensitivity Semi-perishable 2.867*** 2.628***  2.458*** 2.183*** 
  
[0.654] [0.641]  [0.595] [0.570] 
 
Perishable 4.208*** 4.285***  3.206*** 3.189*** 
  
[1.252] [1.322]  [1.064] [1.101] 
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Conditioning group 
 
Country 
 
Country 
  
Country 
 
Country 
 
Time fixed effects No Yes  No Yes 
  Observations 13,602 13,602  10,243 10,243 
Note:  SE in the brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Case Study 
The Impact of the Russian Import 
Ban on Ukrainian Confectionary 
Producers 
Elena Besedina and Tom Coupe  
Kyiv School of Economics* 
1. Introduction 
At the end of July 2013, Roshen, the biggest confectionary company of 
Ukraine, was banned by Russia. The official explanation was that 
Roshen’s products contained dangerous substances 
“Rospotrebnadzor said in a report Wednesday that the decision on 
suspending the imports was taken in the wake of exposure of certain 
encroachment on the legislative requirements regarding sanitary 
and epidemiological protection /organoleptical indicators, toxic 
additives/ and the legislation protecting consumer rights 
/inconsistency of the information on the nutritional value of 
products placed on the labels/. The agency said, in part, that 
Roshen’s milk chocolate contained benzo/a/pyerene - a substance 
having carcinogenic and bio-accumulative properties13”.  
Roshen denied these claims14 and none of the other countries to which 
Roshen exports took any measures against its products. What’s more, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Tajikistan tested Roshen’s product 
                                                             
*  This case is written with financial support by “Non-tariff barriers, food safety and 
international food trade” joint project of Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
(NUPI),  University of Life Sciences and Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) funded by 
the Research Council of Norway (Contract no. 216742/O10). 
13  http://itar-tass.com/en/russia/697983 
14  http://www.roshen.com/en/news/corporate-news/korporacija-roshen-
osucshestvljaet-svoju-dejatelnost-otkryto-i-v-ramkah-2326-2326-2326/ 
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and found no health risks15. Russia was the most important export 
market for Roshen. 
Commentators have suggested two (complementary) reasons for this 
ban: 
1. The ban was a retaliation against Ukraine imposing custom duties 
on cars imported from Russia16. 
2. This ban was aimed at Roshen’s owner, Petro Poroshenko, a 
potential candidate for the next Ukrainian president, and an open 
supporter of Ukraine’s integration with the European Union (and 
not the Russia-led Customs Union)17. 
At the end of October 2013, Ukraine brought the ban of Roshen 
products by Russia to the attention of the WTO Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade18. At the end of November 2013, there were some first 
signals that the ban would soon be lifted19, and at the end of December 
2013, Russian health officials made public statements that the 
violations had been corrected and that in early 2014 the ban would be 
lifted20.  
The ban was not lifted, however, as the relations between Ukraine 
and Russia continued to deteriorate after the February 2014 Maidan 
Revolution. In September 2014, Russia banned all confectionary 
imports from Ukraine, mentioning violations of labeling standards by 
KONTI and AVK21, the two remaining major exporters of confectio-
nary22. 
                                                             
15  http://www.confectionerynews.com/Regulation-Safety/Roshen-chocolate-okayed-
by-Moldova-Tadzhikistan-Kazakhstan-and-Belarus 
16  http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-ukrainian-chocolate-ban/25060451.html 
17  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/business/international/ukrainian-
chocolates-caught-in-trade-war-between-europe-and-
russia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
18  http://itar-tass.com/en/russia/706247 
19  http://www.confectionerynews.com/Manufacturers/Russia-lifts-ban-on-Roshen-
chocolate 
20  http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-food-ban-ukraine-chocolate-
roshen/25210934.html 
21  http://www.rospotrebnadzor.ru/about/info/news/news_ details.php? ELEMENT 
_ID=2333&sphrase_id=161089 
22  Note that the Russian ban was not the only that faced Ukrainian exporters: in April-
May, 2014 Belarus complicated customs clearance of confectionary goods forcing 
importers to increase their prices in order to protect Belarus producers - 
http://www.capital.ua/en/publication/22835-ukrainskie-konditery-namereny-
borotsya-za-mesto-na-vneshnikh-rynkakh-drugogo-vykhoda-net 
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II. Some background on the Ukrainian Confectionary Market  
Even before the ban, the Ukrainian confectionery industry was not 
doing that well, with gradually declining production volumes. As of 
2013, Ukrainian producers exported more than 40% of their products 
(Table 1).  
Table 1. Total production and exports of Ukrainian confectionary industry 
 
Year Production, ‘000 tons Exports, ‘000 tons 
2006 1001.6 281.0 
2007 1084.6 336.4 
2008 1116.9 373.9 
2009 1068.3 383.4 
2010 1088.4 437.2 
2011 1066.1 438.4 
2012 1074.9 438.8 
2013 1003.9 423.2 
 
Source: Ukrkondprom (2013) 
 
As Figure 1 shows Ukrainian confectionary exports are highly 
concentrated both in terms of products and destinations as a 
substantial part of the production is being exported to the CIS 
countries, mainly to Russia and the main exported confectionary 
products are chocolates (HS code 180690). Market and product 
concentration are correlated, for example, around 60 percent of all 
Ukrainian exports in category “Chocolate and other food preparations 
containing cocoa” (HS code 1806) in 2012 were supplied to the 
Russian market, which also account around 34 percent of total 
Ukrainian confectionary exports. Given a high share of exports in total 
production, this makes Ukrainian producers very vulnerable to trade 
barriers in the primary destination markets. 
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Figure 1. Export destinations in 2012 and product concentration for 
confectionary industry (HS codes 1704, 1806 and 1905) 
 
  
 
Figure 2. Chocolate Confectionary Market Size, in thousands tons 
 
Source: Euromonitor (2012) 
 
At the same time, the decline came mainly from sugar confectionary 
while the chocolate confectionary market was developing dynamically 
and was forecasted to continue growing. Euromonitor (2012)  
forecasted substantial growth in both volumes and value in the 
chocolate confectionary market (Figure 2).    
There are several hundreds of confectionary producers in Ukraine 
with Roshen being by far the biggest player, followed by KONTI and 
AVK (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Distribution of confectionary market shares among producers as of 
2012 
 
Source: KONTI (2012) 
III. The impact of the ban on the Ukrainian Confectionary 
producers 
Roshen exported about 100,000 tons of sweets to Russia23. Compared 
to its total production of 450,000 tons, this represented a significant 
share24. 
After the ban, some of the production was redirected to Ukraine:  
“Mr. Moskalevskyi, the director, said. While the company has been 
able to redirect some chocolate to Ukraine, the drop in output shows 
Ukrainians can’t eat it all25.” 
This redirection was facilitated by the fact that the retail sector in 
Ukraine was growing and by the fact that Roshen expanded its own 
network of Roshen-branded shops. 
“Under the Russia’s embargo, Roshen Corporation was able 
to increase sales of sweets in Ukraine, says Associate Director at EY 
                                                             
23  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/business/international/ukrainian-
chocolates-caught-in-trade-war-between-europe-and-
russia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
24  http://www.roshen.com/en/about/general/ 
25  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/business/international/ukrainian-
chocolates-caught-in-trade-war-between-europe-and-
russia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
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in Ukraine Oleksandr Romanyshyn. «The fact is that the number 
of supermarkets in Ukraine increased by more than 20% in 2013, 
which is one of the main driving forces of the growth in sales, 
in particular of confectionery products,» he explains. Roshen’s own 
chain of stores, the number of which is growing is one of the most 
active retail sales channels. Based on the information on the 
company’s website there are 18 stores in Kyiv, which is 38.46% 
more than a year ago26.” 
Still, the ban led to overcapacity: 
“The company had recently invested in a robotic assembly line for a 
crushed hazelnut and dark chocolate candy that is popular in 
Russia. But since the ruling, the line is underused, though still 
making reduced quantities of a devilish little sweet, called Evening 
in Kiev, only not for the Russians27.” 
And already in late 2013, rumors started to appear that Roshen would 
fire 40028 and even up to 1000 employees29. But these rumors were 
denied by Roshen’s owner, Poroshenko30. Roshen did stop production 
in Mariupol in February 2014, however and closed its factory in May 
201431.  
Overall, experts have estimated losses for Roshen of up to $200 
million32. 
After the ban against all Ukrainian producers was introduced in 
September 2014, the owner of KONTI, Borys Kolesnyk, admitted that 
exports were being redirected to the domestic market but he did not 
expect this to affect prices negatively: 
“Exports will decline twice due to the embargo to US $300 mn. 
Kolesnyk admits that the domestic market accumulates the surplus 
of products… Kolesnyk believes the prices on the Ukrainian market 
will not fall. Due to the devaluation of hryvnya, the prices of 
                                                             
26  http://www.capital.ua/en/publication/29378-pokupatelyam-roshen-pozvolyat-
vybrat-samye-sladkie-aktivy#ixzz3QCxUMxdE 
27  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/business/international/ukrainian-
chocolates-caught-in-trade-war-between-europe-and-
russia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
28  http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21583998-trade-war-sputters-tussle-
over-ukraines-future-intensifies-trading-insults 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/report-says-ukraine-
candymaker-roshen-to-cut-staff-following-russian-embargo/489026.html 
30  http://sputniknews.com/russia/20131107/184575125/Embargo-Hit-Ukrainian-
Candymaker-Says-Workforce-Wont-Be-Cut.html 
31  http://www.novostimira.com.ua/news-eng-107621.html 
32  http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/report-says-ukraine-
candymaker-roshen-to-cut-staff-following-russian-embargo/489026.html 
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ingredients rose significantly, so it is unlikely that manufacturers 
will lower their prices33.” 
Another reason why prices might not fall after the ban, is that several 
producers had to halt production at plants that were located in the 
areas that were affected by the military conflict between the Ukrainian 
army and separatists. 
In July 2014, AVK stopped production at its Luhansk factory, in 
January 2015, it also stopped production in Donetsk. The largest 
production unit of AVK in Dnipropetrovsk continued operation34. 
Similarly, the owner of KONTI acknowledged that its company 
works only at 40% of its capacity, with employees being sent on unpaid 
leave35. 
IV. The Impact of the Export Ban on domestic prices 
Economic theory predicts that the effect of the barriers to exports 
(either in the form of tariffs or other non-tariff barriers) on the domestic 
market will largely depend of the existing market structure. Under 
perfect competition, barriers to export lead to reduction of domestic 
price of the good that is subject to the 
barrier, as domestic supply exceeds 
domestic demand. There is anecdotal 
evidence from the recent experience 
of anti-sanctions imposed by the RF 
against the EU exports that bans did 
affect the price. For example, as the 
picture that appeared on social 
networks demonstrates the price for 
cheese in Finland did decrease. 
However, under monopolistic 
competition, firms have several 
strategies to cope with the exports 
barrier/ban:  
 Company can reduce output 
to avoid reduction in domestic 
price 
                                                             
33  http://www.capital.ua/en/publication/28814-konfety-non-grata-rossiya-
otkazalas-ot-sladostey-ukrainskogo-proizvodstva#ixzz3QCYjLGZD 
34 http://www.capital.ua/en/news/39123-avk-ostanovila-fabriku-v-donetske 
35  http://www.capital.ua/en/publication/28814-konfety-non-grata-rossiya-
otkazalas-ot-sladostey-ukrainskogo-proizvodstva#ixzz3QCYjLGZD 
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 Company can diversify away from the affected market sell more 
to other markets decreasing exports price  
 Company can do both. 
As Figure 1 above demonstrates, half of Ukrainian confectionary 
exports are chocolate and related products, thus the effect of the 
should be felt more in the chocolate production. In many countries 
chocolate production is concentrated and dominated by large 
producers, while candy markets are more fragmented (Sutton, 1991). 
This is explained by the fact that fixed costs for chocolates production 
are found to be larger than the setup costs for candies production, e.g. 
in the UK the former are almost three times of the latter (ibid.).  
Also from the statements by market participants above, we know 
that in Ukraine, confectionary companies had a hard time to replace 
the exports to Russia by exports to other countries. We also know that 
output decreased as factories got closed both because of the 
consequences of the ban (Roshen) and because of to the military 
conflict in Ukraine (AVK, KONTI).  
Hence, given the above we hypothesize that Ukrainian 
confectionary market is characterized by monopolistic competition and 
would expect to observe only a small effect of the ban on local prices. 
In the case of Ukraine, different companies were hit by the export ban 
at different points in time. While Roshen was affected from mid 2013, 
other Ukrainian producers were only affected in September 2014. If the 
bans had an effect we should see differences in pricing between Roshen 
and the other Ukrainian producers in the first period (during which 
only Roshen was banned which should put downward pressure on 
Roshen’s prices) but not or less during the second period when all 
export to Russia of Ukrainian confectionary was banned. 
We do not compare the Ukrainian (domestic) companies to the 
foreign competitors on the local market since there was a substantial 
devaluation of the local currency, the Ukrainian Hryvnia, throughout 
2014, which is likely to affect domestic and imported prices in different 
ways. At the same time, this devaluation caused an upward pressure on 
the prices of confectionary products as the prices of ingredients 
increased. This meant that all producers had a good excuse to increase 
prices, but a priori we expect that Roshen would increase its prices less 
given the ban on the export of its products to Russia. 
Our data come from the main Ukrainian online supermarket, 
zakaz.ua. From this website, we scraped prices since January/February 
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201436. While this does not allow us to estimate how the mid 2013 ban 
immediately affected Roshen, we can compare the differences in 
pricing between February 2014 and the beginning of September 5, 
2014 (when Russia only banned Roshen), with the differences in 
pricing between September 6 and the beginning of 2015 when all 
companies were subject to the ban.  
As an example, we look at two nearly identical products: Roshen 
Kyiv Vechirnii (232 grams) and AVK Vechir Zolotyi (225 grams), both 
similarly shaped chocolate candies with whole nuts, a traditional 
Ukrainian chocolate. 
  
Source: Pictures are taken from the zakaz.ua website 
 
The price, in the Metro supermarket at the beginning of 2014, of the 
AVK product was UAH 23.68, increased by 57% to UAH 37.24 by the 
end of August, and then increased a further 20% to UAH 44.9 by the 
end of 2014. Over the same time period, the Roshen version of 
(basically) the same chocolates increased from 29.98 UAH to 42.9 UAH 
(+ 43%) and then to 53.9 UAH (+25%). Hence, when only Roshen was 
banned, it increased its prices less than its competitor, while when 
both were banned the differences in the change in price was much less. 
This example suggest that the ban could be a potential explanation for 
Roshen’s lesser increase in prices.  
We next do a more extended analysis using all the products of the 
different brands for which we have data for both time periods. We have 
data for two retail shops in Kyiv – Metro and Fourchette. Table 2 gives 
the results for the data from Metro, while Table 3 for Fourchette. 
                                                             
36  We had a preliminary agreement with zakaz.ua to give us access to data for earlier 
periods but unfortunately, they recently informed us they have no time to help us 
given the difficult economic situation in Ukraine. 
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Table 2. Prices and price evolutions at Metro 
 
Brand # Start price  Δ Jan-Aug Δ Sep-Dec 
Roshen 81 13.73 1.33 1.21 
AVK 27 24.47 1.23 1.21 
KONTI 14 23.71 1.08 NA 
 
Note: All prices and price changes are averages across the products of a given 
brand. Starting price is the price in January 
 
We have 27 different AVK products and 81 different Roshen products 
for which we have data in both time periods. For Konti we only have 
data for the first period, as during the second periods Konti products 
disappeared from the shelves. Note that the array of products of all 
brands has shrunk substantially: at the beginning of 2014, there were 
about 200 Roshen products and about 70 AVK and Konti products 
(supermarkets generally reacted to the crisis by shrinking the range of 
products they sold37). 
Interestingly, Roshen offers, on average, cheaper products. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in the period, January-August 2014, when only 
Roshen products were boycotted, the average percentage price increase 
of Roshen products was bigger than the average percentage price 
increase of AVK. In the second period, the average price increases were 
similar for AVK and Roshen. One of the possible explanations for such 
average increase is that Roshen enlarged its assortments with more 
expensive products.   
Similar results are found for the more upscale Fourchette (Furshet) 
supermarket. In Fourchette, we also have products of another 
Ukrainian producer, Zhytomyr’s Sweets. 
Table 3. Prices and price evolutions at Fourchette 
 
Brand # Start price Δ Jan-Aug Δ Sep-Dec 
Roshen 78 30.16 1.26 1.00 
AVK 43 40.84 1.16 1.06 
Konti 7 35.86 1.03 1.18 
Zhytomyr’s sweets 9 27.17 1.13 1.00 
 
Note: All prices and price changes are averages across the products of a given 
brand. Starting price is the price in January 
 
                                                             
37 http://forbes.ua/business/1370806-opusteyut-li-polki-ukrainskih-magazinov 
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Again, Roshen has the cheaper products (based on the median, Roshen 
products are also cheaper than Zhytmyr’s products) but has bigger 
price increases in the period that only Roshen was banned. 
Of course, given the difference in initial starting level (Roshen’s 
average price is much lower) one could argue that the averages we 
compare are not relevant since the products are not comparable 
enough across brands.  
To make observations more comparable, we next regress the change 
in prices on the initial price level to account for possible effects of price 
levels on price changes, and we include dummies for the type of 
products (candies, chocolate biscuit, and other). 
Table 4a. Controlling for initial price levels (Metro) 
 
Δ Prices Jan-Aug Δ Prices Sept-Dec 
Price at the beginning of the period 0.0028*** 0.0017*** 
 (3.2) (2.46) 
Roshen 0.114*** 0.008 
 (3.42) (0.28) 
Constant 1.14*** 1.14*** 
 (27.9) (35.5) 
#observ. 108 108 
R2 adj. 0.12 0.09 
 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AVK is based category, t-statistics in 
parentheses; robust standard errors are used and dummies for different types 
of products are included. 
 
Table 4b. Controlling for initial price levels (Fourchette) 
 
Δ Prices Jan-Aug Δ Prices Sept-Dec 
Price at the beginning of the period -0.00077** 0.0006* 
 (-1.96) (1.85) 
Roshen 0.09*** -0.056*** 
 (3.04) (-2.41) 
Zhytomyr’s sweets -0.15*** 0.13 
 (-3.04) (1.15) 
Constant 1.13*** 1.07*** 
 (42.9) (30.6) 
#observ. 137 137 
R2 adj. 0.25 0.17 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. AVK is based category, t-statistics in 
parentheses; robust standard errors are used and dummies for different types 
of products are included. 
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The results for two supermarkets are presented in Tables 4a and 4b, 
respectively. Prices of both producers, Roshen and AVK increased over 
the periods under consideration which can be explained by sharp 
devaluation of Ukrainian currency and increase in price for major 
inputs. However, as we can see, even after controlling for initial levels, 
Roshen products have a significantly higher price increase in the first 
period (+ 11.4% for Metro and +9% for Fourchette) but not in the 
second period38. Actually, the rate of change in Roshen prices for 
products sold in Fourchette was lower relative to AVK products over the 
second period when all producers where banned from the Russian 
market. 
V. Concluding remarks 
In this case study, we look at how Ukrainian confectionary producers 
reacted to the export ban imposed by Russia. Our findings seem to 
suggest that exports ban imposed by the RF did not have negative 
effect, consistent with perfect competition model, on the domestic price 
of the affected producer. On the opposite, the affected firm, Roshen, on 
average increased prices for its products. This finding is consistent with 
the explanation that adaptation to the ban went primarily through 
changes in the assortment of the products in the domestic market, as 
Roshen introduced higher quality (more expensive) products in its 
array. Our findings also seem to be consistent with our hypothesis that 
Ukrainian confectionary industry is characterized by monopolistic 
competition as the firms are able to differentiate their products from 
competitors. Thus, in line with economic theory, the adaptation to the 
ban did not go mainly through prices in 2014 but rather through 
changes in output. It should be noted that due to data limitation we 
could not analyze immediate effect of the ban which happened in mid 
2013. Hence we cannot exclude that the main price effects might have 
happened earlier when the ban was introduced.  
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